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CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CASES ON THE GROUND:
ALTERING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Paul G. Gill *
For federal criminal defendants or their counsel first caught up
in a case involving classified information, it is easy to find the
text of the Classified Information Procedures Act ("CIPA" or "the
Act").' The Department of Justice makes available a synopsis of
the Act, obviously from the perspective of the prosecution, but
generously flavored with case law advancing that perspective.2
Case law sustaining CIPA against constitutional attack, either
facially or as applied, is easy enough to find.3 Plenty of related
case law likewise holds that CIPA's procedures allow courts to
reasonably balance the executive's right to protect classified in-
formation against a criminal accused's constitutional rights to
know and use evidence material to his defense.4
There appears to be less attention paid to how CIPA affects the
typical attorney-client relationship as defined by ethics rules (and
good common sense), or the related questions CIPA may raise for
defendants and counsel accustomed to that status quo.5 This arti-
cle will focus on this less discussed arena. Part I identifies ethical
* Assistant Federal Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1990, University of
Richmond School of Law. His experience as a practitioner with classified information has
included his representation of a Russian expatriate found on an Afghan battlefield in 2009
after a spectacularly unsuccessful Taliban authorized attack on Afghan Border Police and
the American forces that responded, who was five years later charged with various viola-
tions of American law and tried as a civilian.
1. Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, CRIMINAL
RESOURCE MANUAL § 2054 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual
-2054-synopsis-classified-information-procedures-act-cipa.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2008);
United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1326-29 (D.N.M. 2000).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 247, 254 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. de-
nied, 555 U.S. 1170 (2009); United States v. Salah, 462 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (N.D. Ill.
2006); United States v. Scarfo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 572, 582-83 (D.N.J. 2001).
5. But see David I. Greenberger, Note, An Overview of the Ethical Implications of the
Classified Information Procedures Act, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 151 (1998).
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and procedural rules which govern most criminal cases not in-
volving classified information.6 The article then describes several
features of CIPA, which necessarily contradict those familiar
rules and procedures in Part II. In Part III, the article concludes
with an overview of some related proposed reforms of CIPA, re-
forms which would at least offer defense counsel more opportuni-
ty to argue for discovery of classified information, and the ability
to use that information at trial, without offering a detailed ac-
counting of their defense theories to the prosecution.
I. FOUNDATIONAL ETHICAL RULES
It should be no surprise that the first ethical rule demands
competence. More specifically, "[a] lawyer shall provide compe-
tent representation to a client."' The rule recognizes that compe-
tence "includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal
elements of the problem."9 Competence may be derived not merely
through one's own prior experience, but through association of
experts or other lawyers of "established competence in the field.""
Competence means nothing without effective communication
with the client, which gets its own ethical rule as well.1 The rule
has three equally important parts: (1) "keep a client reasonably
informed about the status of a matter," complying with his rea-
sonable requests for information; 2 (2) "explain a matter to the ex-
tent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation"; 3 and (3) "inform the cli-
ent of facts pertinent to the matter and of communications from
another party that may significantly affect settlement or resolu-
tion of the matter."
14
6. This article will primarily refer to Virginia Disciplinary Rules. For present pur-
poses, they are consistent with the ABA Model Rules, including rules governing compe-
tence and communication with clients. See VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt.
(2016); VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. (2009).
7. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (2016).
8. Id.; accord MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
9. VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 5 (2016).
10. See id. cmt. 1.
11. Id. r. 1.4.
12. Id. r. 1.4(a).
13. Id. r. 1.4(b).
14. Id. r. 1.4(c).
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Two Virginia Legal Ethics Opinions ("LEO") illustrate the
breadth and importance of the rule mandating communication
with the client.
In one, the Virginia State Bar considered a situation in which
the prosecutor told the defense counsel the name of a cooperating
witness and the witness's anticipated testimony against the de-
fendant, if the case were to go to trial. 5 The prosecutor offered a
plea deal, but requested that defense counsel not share the wit-
ness's name and testimony with the client.
16
The Bar indicated that defense counsel's compliance with the
prosecutor's request would be unethical: the identity and in-
volvement of the witness is relevant and cannot be withheld. 7 It
would even be unethical for the prosecutor to make such a plea
offer, because it solicited unethical conduct by the defense coun-
sel." However, because the prosecutor is not obliged to offer a
plea deal or provide all incriminating evidence or witness testi-
mony to the defense, she could ethically offer a plea based on a
nameless confidential informant. 9
A second LEO addressed a more common situation involving
limitations on discovery.2" The question was the propriety of a
prosecutor imposing, and defense counsel agreeing to, a rule that
discovery may be shown to the defendant, but not given to him,
and ultimately must be returned to the prosecutor.2 That situa-
tion, the Bar opined, was ethical because "the lawyer is allowed
and encouraged to share the information from the discovery ma-
terials with his client."" The situation created no conflict with
Rule 1.4, because the lawyer "can explain all pertinent facts to his
client" while reviewing discovery with him."
In general, then, reading these two LEOs together, the lawyer
cannot withhold from the client information he receives that is
relevant to a client's decision. This includes information about
discovery and other pertinent facts, even though the lawyer can
15. Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1854 (2010).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1864 (2012) (revised 2014).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
2017]
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agree not to leave the physical representation of that information
with his client, as long as the lawyer shares the substance of the
information with his client.
As much as ethical rules emphasize sharing discovery and oth-
er relevant information with clients, they say little about com-
municating with prosecutors. In federal court, rules may require
modest pretrial disclosure by defense counsel of witnesses, exhib-
its, and experts,24 or advance disclosure of alibi,25 mental health
related defenses,26 or affirmative defenses like public authority.27
Likewise, prudence and tactics may dictate pretrial disclosure of
some parts of a defense theory, such as via motions to suppress,
to compel, or in limine to exclude evidence, motions that often re-
quire the prosecution to provide more information about its case.
The same considerations may warrant some information sharing
in the course of plea negotiations.
But ethical rules and judges do not generally require defense
counsel to disclose their defense theory and evidence in advance
of trial. CIPA plays havoc with both this status quo and the ethi-
cal default of disclosure to clients.
II. THE CIPA LOOKING GLASS
CIPA by its terms applies to "any information or material that
has been determined by ... Executive order, statute, or regula-
tion, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national security," with "[niational security" defined to
mean "national defense and foreign relations of the United
States."2
CIPA requires the court on motion of any party or its own mo-
tion to hold a pretrial conference to establish the timing of re-
quests for discovery and other matters addressed by the Act or
involving classified information generally.29 However, the Act of-
fers no substantive rule or procedural vehicle for challenging the
24. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1.
26. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
27. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3.
28. CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1 (2012).
29. Id. § 2.
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executive's classification of information." As courts have com-
mented: "A defendant cannot challenge this classification. A court
cannot question it."3' Rather, CIPA provides pretrial procedures
permitting the trial judge to rule in sealed proceedings on ques-
tions of admissibility involving classified information before such
evidence is introduced in open court."
Nor does CIPA describe how civilian prosecutors and law en-
forcement personnel determine whether classified information ex-
ists and is relevant to the prosecution or defense of a criminal
case. Those determinations are based on prosecutorial judgments,
discovery rules, and the constitutional obligations of the govern-
ment to search for and provide potentially favorable evidence to
defendants.33 One court in an infamous case emphasized the im-
portance of those obligations nearly twenty years ago:
Application of the Brady doctrine to this case is especially difficult
because the scope of inquiry is so broad and the information gather-
ing capability of all government agencies is so great. The lawyers
appearing on behalf of the United States, speaking for the entire
government, must inform themselves about everything that is
known in all of the archives and all of the data banks of all of the
agencies collecting information which could assist in the construction
of alternative scenarios to that which they intend to prove at trial.
That is their burden under Brady[, and it] .. .is not excused by any
inconvenience, expense, annoyance or delay.
34
At least two scholars question whether such exhortations are
"borne out in executive protocol," however.3 The relevant federal
protocol makes clear that the "law enforcement community"
("LEC") and "intelligence community" ("IC") are different parties
with different obligations.36 The former term includes "all
[fiederal investigative and prosecutive agencies., 37 The "intelli-
gence community" includes certain designated agencies, like the
30. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 750 F.2d 1215, 1217 (4th Cir. 1984).
31. Id.
32. Id. (discussing legislative history).
33. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421 (1995); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963).
34. United States v. McVeigh, 954 F. Supp. 1441, 1450 (D. Colo. 1997).
35. Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REv. 981,
1040 (2013).
36. To read the observations of a former federal prosecutor and CIA attorney on this
point, see Afsheen John Radsan, Remodeling the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA), 32 CARDozO L. REv. 437, 437-41 (2010).
37. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-90.210(1), https:
//www.justice.gov/usaml/usam-9-9000-national-security#9-90.210.
2017]
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Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency, as
well as "intelligence components" of the Department of State,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Treasury, De-
partment of Energy, and "respective military services."38
Protocol forbids Department of Justice or federal prosecutors
from even "[i]nitial contacts" with the IC, except on approval by
the National Security Division's Counterintelligence and Export
Control Section ("CES"), of a written request for a search of IC
files.39 The CES also acts as the intermediary between the prose-
cution team and the IC.
4°
CIPA has provisions worded to suggest that "defendants"
themselves have access to classified information and active roles
in advocating for the right to use such information or declassified
substitutes thereof for investigative and trial purposes."' That is
misleading.
CIPA requires the court, on request of the government, to issue
an order "to protect against the disclosure of any classified infor-
mation disclosed by the United States to any defendant in any
criminal case."42 In a case in which a defendant is charged with
national security or terrorism related crimes, the defendant him-
self is likely to be ineligible for the security clearance to even
have access to classified information." His counsel may be able to
obtain appropriate security clearances to access the information,
but even then, they will likely be required not to disclose classi-
fied information to the uncleared defendant. 4
CIPA in those situations directly conflicts with the general eth-
ical rules of communicating with the client. 5 Instead of promoting
communication between cleared counsel and uncleared defend-
ants, CIPA prohibits it. Indeed, it goes further, because classified
38. Id.
39. Id. § 9-90.210(2).
40. Id. § 9-90.210(2)-(4).
41. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 4-5 (2012) (addressing discovery of classified infor-
mation by defendants, and notice of defendant's intention to disclose classified infor-
mation).
42. Id. § 3.
43. EDWARD C. LIu & TODD GARvEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41742, PROTECTING
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS: THE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT 3-4 (2012) (noting practice and its approval by courts and
commentators).
44. Id.
45. See supra Part I.
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information which cannot be disclosed to uncleared persons may
prove unusable even for purposes of investigation. That is, coun-
sel not only cannot discuss classified discovery with the client,
which by definition bares some relevance to the prosecution or de-
fense of the case. They also cannot mention classified discovery
when questioning a witness or consulting with an expert or other
counsel versed in the kind of case.46 In doing so, counsel may be
limited in their ability to rely on others to attain competence in
their representation of the client who doesn't even know what he
doesn't know. 7
Even the litigation the client's cleared counsel pursues to use
classified information is done without the client's knowledge.
That is because it typically occurs in sealed proceedings, to which
the client is generally not privy, to avoid unwanted disclosure of
classified material. The client's ignorance of the classified discov-
ery itself, is matched by the potential for his counsel to be igno-
rant of part of it, in that CIPA authorizes ex parte applications to
the court to "delete specified items of classified information from
documents to be made available to the defendant"-really, his
counsel-to start with, or to "substitute a statement admitting
relevant facts that the classified information would tend to
prove."48
The uncleared client also generally remains ignorant of the
thinking process about what classified information his own coun-
46. The mechanical implications of CIPA are imposing as well. Classified information
can only be transmitted through counsel or staff with security clearances, and must be
maintained in a secured area. All notes and pleadings relating to classified information
must be stored there, as well. Counsel used to sending discovery or pleadings electronical-
ly to other team members, themselves (for work at home), or even the court, cannot do so;
a Department of Justice security officer provides dedicated computers for use in the secure
room, and any secured team member who wants to see the work product it contains must
peruse it in the same room. CIPA is not for the claustrophobic.
47. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
48. CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 4 (2012); see also, e.g., Arjun Chandran, Note, The Classi-
fied Information Procedures Act in the Age of Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-
Specific Manner, 64 DUKE L.J. 1411, 1444 (2015) (criticizing ex parte nature of section 4);
Joshua L. Dratel, Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act: The Growing
Threat to the Adversary Process, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 1041, 1058 (2007) ("Unfettered reliance
on the ex parte opportunities § 4 offers thus has genuine public policy implications, as it
shields questionable government conduct from public view, evaluation, and, ultimately,
correction.").
As Chandran observes, the prosecution may provide classified information on its own
through use of a secure transmission of discovery to cleared defense counsel, or may ask
the court in advance to permit substitutions, admissions, or summaries of the classified
information. Chandran, supra note 48, at 1417-20.
2017]
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sel wants to use. That thinking process which cannot be shared
with the uncleared client, however, must be disclosed by defense
counsel to the prosecution. That is because CIPA requires the de-
fendant to give notice to the court and prosecution of any classi-
fied information reasonably expected to be disclosed "in any man-
ner in connection with any trial or pretrial proceeding" in the
criminal prosecution. 9
The United States has the right under CIPA to a hearing to
make determinations concerning the "use, relevance, or admissi-
bility of classified information that would otherwise be made dur-
ing the trial or pretrial proceeding."" The non-cleared defendant
also does not participate in such hearings, because most are con-
ducted in camera. 1 Even if arguably necessary to allow the gov-
ernment to litigate and the court to determine the necessity of
such disclosures, the procedure is so contrary to the general rules
of criminal defense.
III. RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ABOUT CLASSIFIED DISCOVERY
Predictably, many defendants subject to prosecution in cases
involving classified discovery may view the United States in gen-
eral, and its justice system in particular, with some cynicism.
Those familiar with the general rules of that system may prove
the most cynical of all. Defendants, and lawyers unaccustomed to
dealing with CIPA, may justifiably have several incredulous
questions, which are regrettably easy to answer:
* So, the executive alone decides what is classified; CIPA does
not allow a challenge to the classification itself; and CIPA even
encourages ex parte application to the court to delete classified
information from otherwise discoverable documents, or to substi-
tute a summary or stipulation of facts for classified documents or
information? Answer: yes.-
* Who in the intelligence committee-not just in the abstract,
but in the sense of a named person responsible to the court-is
responsible for seeking discoverable classified information, and
49. CIPA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 5.
50. Id. § 6(a).
51. Id. More specifically, any hearing held pursuant to this section "shall be held in
camera if the Attorney General certifies to the court in such petition that a public proceed-
ing may result in the disclosure of classified information." Id.
[Vol. 51:897
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can be held responsible if such information is never, or not timely,
disclosed? Answer: not always clear.52
* From the client perspective: Are you saying I am not allowed
to view the classified discovery, or obtain information about it
from my own counsel? Answer: yes.
* My own counsel cannot even discuss classified information
with me, or ask questions of me based on the information, with-
out telling the prosecutor and the court what he wants to discuss
or disclose, and for what purpose? Answer: yes.
* When do I get to see and hear this information my lawyers
have? Answer: you do not, unless and until the information is de-
classified, or its disclosure is authorized in some other form.
* More important, when do I get to tell you the information is
true or false, or explain to you why I think it matters?"8 Answer:
see question and answer immediately above.
On the surface, there seems little momentum for lawmakers to
amend CIPA's presumptions favoring limited disclosure of classi-
fied material, but unlimited disclosure of defense strategy, and
nondisclosure of classified discovery to the person most affected
by it-the defendant. Consider the comments of Senator Benja-
min Cardin (D-Md.) in announcing his introduction of the Classi-
fied Information Procedures Reform and Improvement Act of
2010." The senator spoke of the need for "reforms and improve-
ments," to an Act which has gone unchanged for thirty years, not
simply to protect classified information, but "to ensure that a de-
52. The author's experience in one case involved a disclosure the weekend before trial
in 2015, of some small, ultimately declassified, portion of the hours of videotapes of the
defendant's cohorts in the 2009 Taliban approved attack that was the subject of prosecu-
tion. A government witness at trial testified that he had first learned that anyone was
looking for the videos in the last thirty days, and acknowledged that he could have recov-
ered much more had he been asked much earlier.
Several courts have expressed frustration with CIPA proceedings in which representa-
tions of prosecutors are not questioned, but it is later discovered that the prosecutors have
relied on representations of intelligence officer which turn out to be false. See Dratel, su-
pra note 48, at 1058, 1058 n.88.
53. This question is simple enough to answer: never, unless the lawyers persuade the
court to let us share the information or a declassified substitute for it. See CIPA, 18 U.S.C.
app. § 6(c) (2012) (noting that where a court authorizes disclosure of specified classified
information, the court must order substitution through summary of same or statement
admitting relevant facts instead, upon finding the substitutions will "provide the defend-
ant with substantially the same ability to make his defense").
54. 156 CONG. REC. S10816 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2010) (statement of Sen. Cardin).
2017]
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fendant's due process and fair trial rights are not violated., 55 But
it appears that the only significant change the bill would have
wrought to further a defendant's interests is to expressly allow
the trial court to have ex parte conferences with defendants alone
in pretrial conferences to consider matters relating to classified
information. 6
That bill does at least match the primary concerns of others
who view CIPA's weaknesses as its focus on ex parte communica-
tions by the government, the inability of defendants to do the
same, and the non-reciprocal mandate for defendants to describe
in detail for what they want the use of classified information and
why. 7 One expansive proposal would amend CIPA section 4 to al-
low cleared counsel to object to government requests for substitu-
tions and deletions, and thereby argue for discoverability in the
first instance.58 It would also amend section 5 to require declassi-
fication of the defendant's own communications, written or elec-
tronic (e.g., emails, cell phone texts), notwithstanding their sei-
zure by the government. 9 Significantly, it would also amend
section 6 to encourage the use of a series of ex parte conferences
with defense counsel, who could make their case for the use of
classified information, matched by the court's separate confer-
ences solely with the prosecution, allowing the government to
make separate contrary arguments without a full disclosure by
defense counsel of all arguments for use or ability to disclose."
This would be a huge leap forward for defendants, without limit-
ing the government's ability to make its own arguments against
use. "As many defendants have argued, [section 6] effectively re-
quires the defense to hand the government a roadmap of its case
by explaining counsel's theories on the use and relevance of de-
fense evidence."6' At least one court has on its own initiative
adopted such a procedure, 2 but amending section 6 to specifically
call for it would no undoubtedly expand its use dramatically.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Chandran, supra note 48, at 1443-45; Dratel, supra note 48, at 1058.
58. Chandran, supra note 48, at 1443-45.
59. Id. at 1445-46.
60. Id. at 1448.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1449 (citing United States v. Bin Laden, No. S(7) 98 CR. 1023 LBS, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2001)).
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Until such legislative reforms, defense counsel dealing with
CIPA-and their clients-must cope with CIPA's burdens on a
case-by-case basis. Counsel may be relieved of their communica-
tion duties with clients to the extent required to comply with
rules of court which CIPA imposes.63 But the ramifications of
CIPA do alter the attorney-client relationship and add a layer of
complexity to the litigation of a class of cases which is typically
complex to begin with.
63. See VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4 cmt. 7 (Va. State Bar Ass'n 2009) ("Rules
or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer
may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(d) directs compliance with such rules or or-
ders.").
2017]

